(*Disclosure: I have no position in Callidus Capital.)
Callidus is currently suing West Face Capital (a hedge fund) and Veritas Investment Research (an independent research firm) for defamation… and I want no part in being sued. So I will try to be neutral as I talk about my speculation as to why the borrow is expensive. The first thing that comes to mind is the defamation lawsuit against Veritas, a firm that does not do activist shorting. Some short sellers really pay attention when companies sue their critics- more so when the criticism was private rather than public. I’m not saying that short sellers are necessarily right or wrong to bet against such companies- the counterexample would be Fairfax Financial (Fairfax’s stock has done quite well since launching its lawsuits). But it is certainly something that (in my opinion) attracts short sellers.
Some key lessons on mining companies:
- They regularly withhold key information from investors.
- Technical reports should not be relied upon because many of them are disconnected with reality.
Without key information on a mine’s economics, these companies cannot be accurately valued. So… mining stocks aren’t a great place to look for longs. You might spent a lot of effort trying to value a mine and still fall short of being able to find reliable information on that mine.
On the short side, there are some opportunities.
(*Disclosure: Pretium is by far my largest short position so I am biased. Take what I say with a grain of salt and do your own homework.)
The production figures reported in Pretium’s MD&A filed on August 10, 2017 fall far short of the projections from Pretium’s latest published feasibility study.
According to the feasibility study filed on June 30 2014 (effective date June 19, 2014), year 1 production from Pretium’s flagship project would have a head grade of 15.4 g/t gold with a recovery of 96.8%. The effective grade after recovery losses would be 14.9072 g/t gold.
Figures are from Table 17.2 of the technical report.
Compare this with the data from page 2 of the MD&A:
- For June, 8510 ounces of gold were produced and 70805 tonnes of ore were processed. 8510 / 70805 X 28.3495 gram/ounce = 3.407 g/t for June
- For July, 16882 ounces of gold were produced and 83667 tones of ore were processed. 16882 / 83667 X 28.3495 gram/ounce = 5.720 g/t for July
- An average of 4.660 g/t for June and July
The 3.407 g/t and 5.720 g/t fall far short of hitting the 14.907 g/t mark projected from Pretium’s feasibility study three years ago.
While grades so far have been low relative to the estimates from the feasibility study, Pretium does expect grades to ramp up [page 4; emphasis mine]:
As the Brucejack Mine continues to ramp-up grade, we expect the increased production and concomitant proceeds from the sale of doré and flotation concentrate will enable us to overcome our short-term working capital deficit. We expect as gold production ramps up this deficit will reverse (refer to the “Liquidity and Capital Resources” section below). In addition, we are evaluating other opportunities to bolster our short-term working capital.
There is a free website called Change Detection that can send you email alerts whenever a webpage changes. I use it to keep track of:
- Hedge fund letters, e.g. Bronte Capital’s.
- Scumbag client lists. There are certain firms that specialize in helping scumbags. Some of those scumbags are investment banks that publicly post their coverage list.
So instead of constantly re-checking a website, you can simply use ChangeDetection.com to receive email alerts.
I don’t think that Home Capital is a great short at the moment due to the expensive borrow (>60%). The expensive borrow and rising share price suggests a short squeeze.
However, I do think that there are serious issues with the company such as systemically poor underwriting.
This blog post is in reference to John Hempton’s post on Trex; the post points out that Trex’s operating margins are suspiciously high. I haven’t uncovered enough about Trex that would suggest to me that there is some form of egregious accounting fraud occurring. However, I can see how Trex’s margins can appear to be so high. This industry does not sell a commodity. Rather, the industry sells marketing hype and unproven technology.
Trex was one of the companies that pioneered the use of wood-plastic composites as decking material over 2 decades ago. Unfortunately, the composite materials did not live up to their fanfare and marketing hype (e.g. zero maintenance, lasts longer than wood, etc.). There have been issues with composite deck materials from virtually all manufacturers that have led to recalls, expensive warranty claims, and class action lawsuits. Some manufacturers have gone bankrupt and were not able to pay out all warranty claims, leaving homeowners holding the bag.
The current practice is for manufacturers to exclude known problems from their written warranties. These written warranties do not obligate them to stand behind their marketing hype.
(*Disclosure: No position.)
In my previous post, I explained how CXDC’s website was worse than Bill Ackman’s due diligence on Valeant. It turns out that CXDC really does use that website for their operating business; I thought that they simply setup chinaxd.net for Western investors and had another website somewhere else for the operating business.
According to CXDC’s latest 10-K, they had $237M USD in revenue for 2016. They have almost two thousand employees:
As of December 31, 2016, there were 1,960 employees, including 710 in manufacturing, 485 in R&D, 584 in management, 59 in finance, 101 in sales, purchasing and marketing and 21 in other departments.
But apparently they cannot make a fully functional website. Perhaps it is due to a stifling bureaucratic environment of middle management: more than a quarter of their employees (584) are in management.