I previously described AAMC as a “royalty on yield chasing“. AAMC’s economics can potentially be extremely attractive because asset managers can generate extremely high returns on capital. Currently, the stock is trading at very depressed levels. Two explanations for the share price:
- Luxor capital and other major shareholders may be liquidating. Luxor suffered a lot of losses on the Bill Erbey family of stocks.
- AAMC generated close to no fees in the past quarter. Either you think that management screwed up or that there is a temporary hiccup in revenue recognition. Rental revenue, selling the home/mortgage, and marking the asset to BPO value all generate GAAP profits. There is a time period after a BPO (broker price opinion) and before a home is rented out (or sold) where the home will not generate any GAAP profits, which can result in less fees for AAMC.
On April 6, 2015 HLSS and NRZ announced that they have restructured the Feb 22 merger agreement between the two companies (press release). The new deal:
- Reduces the value received by HLSS shareholders.
- In the near term, HLSS has agreed not to transfer subservicing away from Ocwen. Ocwen has given up a little bit of value to reduce some of its unusual risks.
Unfortunately for me, the drama never seems to end at the Erbey complex (OCN/ASPS/HLSS/RESI/AAMC). Ocwen’s regulatory problems has been cascading into other problems. I suppose the lesson here is that some companies sit on very unusual risks. When it rains it pours.
I believe Ocwen’s financing deal with HLSS exposes it to a very unusual risk. Ocwen had (more or less) sold excess servicing rights on its MSRs to HLSS. If Ocwen loses its MSRs, then it has to compensate HLSS for HLSS’ loss. The payment will be for the purchase price of the excess servicing rights adjusted for run-off at rates pre-determined in the contract between Ocwen and HLSS (8-K filing).
I made a mistake. I did not figure out the game that Ocwen and Altisource are playing. Ocwen seems to receive fees from Altisource that could be (mis)construed as kickbacks under its “Data Access and Services Agreement”. These fees could be seen as a quid pro quo (“you scratch my back I’ll scratch yours”) for the big profits that Altisource formerly earned for lender placed insurance “brokerage”.
Today, Ocwen provided a company update for its shareholders. While the stock is up ~14% on the news, I am disappointed with how the current CEO is running the company.
- The update doesn’t seem to mention anything about buying back debt, which currently has fairly high yields (12-13%). To me, this seems like an obvious move to make. Where else might Ocwen get such high returns on capital with little risk?
- The company has halted its share repurchase program.
- The company intends “hire two financial advisors with significant experience in asset backed financing, capital markets, corporate and mortgage finance”. I’m not a fan of companies that piss away money on overpriced labour. Ocwen previously gave its CFO a raise in Dec 2014 but apparently he’s not good enough at his job that Ocwen now needs to hire outside talent.
So far, it seems that the new CEO is bad at capital allocation and bad at maintaining Ocwen’s status as a low-cost operator.
EDIT (2/6/2015): The update also indicated that the company may not be in full compliance with the CFPB metrics:
On the National Mortgage Settlement front, although we do not have the final results of the retesting of certain 2014 metrics by the National Monitor overseeing compliance, we do expect that, similar to many other Servicers in 2014, we will have metrics that will require remediation through corrective action plans as defined by the settlement.
This lengthy post covers different ways in which mortgage servicers can get ahead.