(*Disclosure: Pretium is by far my largest short position so I am biased. Take what I say with a grain of salt and do your own homework.)
The production figures reported in Pretium’s MD&A filed on August 10, 2017 fall far short of the projections from Pretium’s latest published feasibility study.
According to the feasibility study filed on June 30 2014 (effective date June 19, 2014), year 1 production from Pretium’s flagship project would have a head grade of 15.4 g/t gold with a recovery of 96.8%. The effective grade after recovery losses would be 14.9072 g/t gold.
Figures are from Table 17.2 of the technical report.
Compare this with the data from page 2 of the MD&A:
- For June, 8510 ounces of gold were produced and 70805 tonnes of ore were processed. 8510 / 70805 X 28.3495 gram/ounce = 3.407 g/t for June
- For July, 16882 ounces of gold were produced and 83667 tones of ore were processed. 16882 / 83667 X 28.3495 gram/ounce = 5.720 g/t for July
- An average of 4.660 g/t for June and July
The 3.407 g/t and 5.720 g/t fall far short of hitting the 14.907 g/t mark projected from Pretium’s feasibility study three years ago.
While grades so far have been low relative to the estimates from the feasibility study, Pretium does expect grades to ramp up [page 4; emphasis mine]:
As the Brucejack Mine continues to ramp-up grade, we expect the increased production and concomitant proceeds from the sale of doré and flotation concentrate will enable us to overcome our short-term working capital deficit. We expect as gold production ramps up this deficit will reverse (refer to the “Liquidity and Capital Resources” section below). In addition, we are evaluating other opportunities to bolster our short-term working capital.
I don’t think that Home Capital is a great short at the moment due to the expensive borrow (>60%). The expensive borrow and rising share price suggests a short squeeze.
However, I do think that there are serious issues with the company such as systemically poor underwriting.
This blog post is in reference to John Hempton’s post on Trex; the post points out that Trex’s operating margins are suspiciously high. I haven’t uncovered enough about Trex that would suggest to me that there is some form of egregious accounting fraud occurring. However, I can see how Trex’s margins can appear to be so high. This industry does not sell a commodity. Rather, the industry sells marketing hype and unproven technology.
Trex was one of the companies that pioneered the use of wood-plastic composites as decking material over 2 decades ago. Unfortunately, the composite materials did not live up to their fanfare and marketing hype (e.g. zero maintenance, lasts longer than wood, etc.). There have been issues with composite deck materials from virtually all manufacturers that have led to recalls, expensive warranty claims, and class action lawsuits. Some manufacturers have gone bankrupt and were not able to pay out all warranty claims, leaving homeowners holding the bag.
The current practice is for manufacturers to exclude known problems from their written warranties. These written warranties do not obligate them to stand behind their marketing hype.
(*Disclosure: No position.)
(Pretium has a US$1.8B market cap and the borrow is in the low single digits. I have written about this stock previously.)
Back in 2013, Strathcona resigned from the Brucejack gold project due to disagreements over what Pretium was telling investors. Graham Farquharson (Strathcona’s head honcho) was being a gentleman and allowed Pretium to disclose on their own terms (with their own PR spin). Unfortunately, Pretium instead tried to discredit Strathcona.
So, Farquharson did an interview with The Northern Miner, a trade publication. You can read the interview on the website (no paywall):
Yes, and we told them that it has an excellent chance of being a small-tonnage, high-grade mine in the Cleopatra vein, and a couple of other similar occurrences that they found in the last drilling program. If they lined all those up, there’s an excellent chance that they could have a small-tonnage, high-grade gold mine. But they will not have a mine producing 425,000 oz. a year for the next 20 years, as they have been advertising so far.
Here’s the crazy part. This is 2017 and Pretium is almost finished building that mine.
(Unfortunately I did not have the time to fully research this.)
Improvements in shale extraction technology and a glut of capital have basically destroyed oil and natural gas prices. While Exxon’s management is ok, the company cannot defy commodity prices. Its upstream assets aren’t worth that much anymore because they’re inherently leveraged to oil prices. But despite the dramatic decline in oil prices, Exxon’s share price remains high.
The put options are interesting to me since implied volatility is low (20-30%+) and the company is overvalued. The options are barely more expensive than SPY puts (in terms of implied volatility), except that oil prices fell by half and America’s GDP did not.
A back of the envelope calculation puts Exxon’s private market value at <$129B versus a market cap of $359B.
Victor Luis, Coach’s CEO, has told investors about his brand transformation plans. In practice however, many aspects of his brand transformation plan have not panned out. Coach has succeeded in discouraging its fans from shopping at retail/mainline stores without actually reducing the discounting of the brand.
(*Disclosure: I am short.)
Hollysys is a Chinese company that designs high-tech stuff. Interestingly enough, they were able to grow revenues, profits, and operating cash flow without having to increase capex. See the chart on the left from page 31 from the latest investor presentation: